Alternative Size and Lifetime Measurements for High-Energy Heavy-Ion Collisions

Two-Particle correlations based on the interference of identical particles has provided the chief means for determining the shape and lifetime of sources in relativistic heavy ion collisions. Here, Strong and Coulomb induced correlations are shown to provide equivalent information.Comment: Two confusing typographical errors were correcte

Statistical and Dynamic Models of Charge Balance Functions

Charge balance functions, which identify balancing particle-antiparticle pairs on a statistical basis, have been shown to be sensitive to whether hadronization is delayed by several fm/c in relativistic heavy ion collisions. Results from two classes of models are presented here, microscopic hadronic models and thermal models. The microscopic models give results which are contrary to recently published pi+pi- balance functions from the STAR collaboration, whereas the thermal model roughly reproduce the experimental results. This suggests that charge conservation is local at breakup, which is in line with expectations for a delayed hadronization. Predictions are also presented for balance functions binned as a function of Q_inv.Comment: 12 pages 6 figure

Essays on information and competition in banking and service industries

This thesis investigates the relation between information and competition in two particular settings. In the first chapter, I ask which screening and lending choices banks make if their loan offers can be observed by uninformed competitors. I show that banks grant excessive credit and underinvest in screening in order to deter borrower poaching; more competition exacerbates this problem. In a dynamic setting, the model reproduces many stylized facts of lending booms. The second chapter (jointly with Doh-Shin Jeon) investigates the incentives behind commercial open source software. We find that the production of open source software by profit-maximizing firms can be understood as a form of optimal information sharing: by releasing source code, service firms create their own competition which mitigates customer concerns about hold-up problems. We show that the resulting increases in customer investment and collaboration can yield higher profits for the service firm.Aquesta tesi investiga la relació entre la informació i la competència en dues situacions. En el primer capítol, s'analitzen les opcions de cribratge i de préstecs que els bancs fan si les seves ofertes de préstecs poden ser observats pels competidors desinformats. Mostro que els bancs concedeixen préstecs excessius i inverteixen poc en el cribratge per tal de dissuadir la caça furtiva prestatari; més competència exacerba aquest problema. En un entorn dinàmic, el model reprodueix molts fets estilitzats dels auges de crèdit. El segon capítol (en col•laboració amb Doh-Shin Jeon) investiga els incentius darrere de programari de codi obert comercial. Ens trobem que la producció de programari de codi obert per les empreses pot ser entesa com una forma de compartir la informació de manera òptima: alliberant el codi font, les empreses de serveis creen la seva pròpia competència, que mitiga les preocupacions dels clients sobre problemes de captivitat. Es demostra que els augments resultants de la inversió del client i la col•laboració poden rendir més beneficis per a l'empresa de serveis

Bank competition and information production

We show that bank competition diminishes banks’ incentives to produce information about prospective borrowers. We exploit the deregulation of US interstate branching as a shock to competition and use borrowers’ stock returns after loan announcements to measure bank information production. Positive loan announcement returns are reduced in states that deregulate interstate branching, especially for opaque and bank-dependent firms and smaller banks that rely on soft information. Existing (inside) banks reduce information production more than new (outside) banks after deregulation, suggesting that they do so to deter borrower poaching. Furthermore, the probability of a covenant violation increases following deregulation

The redistributive effects of bank capital regulation

We present a general equilibrium model of banks’ optimal capital structure where bankruptcy is costly and investors have heterogeneous endowments and incur a cost for participating in equity markets. We show that, besides its social benefits, capital regulation benefits bank shareholders when it resolves fire sales externalities but not when it acts as a tax on bank profits such as when used to control excessive leverage induced by deposit insurance. Furthermore, capital regulation widens the gap between the returns to bank shareholders and depositors and may reduce investments in projects in favor of storage

Intraday patterns and timing of TARGET2 interbank payments

This paper analyzes daily patterns in the settlement of payments in the European TARGET2 settlement system using a unique transaction-level data set. For the first time, we provide insights into the intraday patterns of bank-to-bank payments